Senior Hamas officials living outside the Gaza Strip are operating under sweeping new security protocols, internal documents reveal, as the group braces for potential Israeli assassination attempts in countries beyond the Middle East. This security crackdown follows a failed Israeli strike in Qatar and signals a new phase of international shadow warfare.
Hamas is implementing extreme counter-surveillance measures for its senior leaders operating abroad, driven by a conviction that Israel plans further assassination attempts against its top officials, potentially in countries outside the Arab world.
The new directives, reviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat and reported by The Times of Israel, point to a high-alert state within the militant group's overseas leadership.
The heightened fear stems directly from Israel's September 9, 2025, airstrike in Doha, Qatar, which targeted a meeting of the group's political leadership. While Hamas' chief negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, survived, the attack killed five Hamas members and a Qatari security officer.
It was a significant escalation, striking the capital of a key U.S. ally and mediator. A Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat that despite "reassurance messages" from the United States that such an operation would not be repeated, the movement's leadership "does not trust Israel".
A History of Cross-Border Strikes
The anxiety is rooted in a pattern of Israeli operations beyond Gaza's borders. Prior to the Doha attack, Israel had killed senior Hamas figures in foreign capitals:
* Saleh al-Arouri, the group's deputy leader, was killed in Beirut, Lebanon, in January 2024.
* Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas's political bureau, was killed in Tehran, Iran, in July 2024.
Paranoid Protocols: The New Security Playbook
In response to what it perceives as an ongoing threat, Hamas has issued an internal security directive with stringent rules designed to thwart Israeli intelligence gathering and precision strikes.
| Security Measure | Rationale (Per Hamas Directive) |
No fixed meeting places; use rotating, irregular locations. | Prevents establishing predictable patterns and targetable hubs.
Mobile phones banned within 70 meters of any meeting site. | Prevents tracking via cellular signals and Wi-Fi; turning phones off is deemed insufficient.
Ban on all electronic devices, including smart watches. | Devices can be hacked or used to detect the number of people in a room.
Venues must not have air conditioners, internet routers, TV screens, or intercoms. | These appliances are viewed as potential surveillance tools or tracking beacons.
Constant visual inspections for hidden miniature cameras. | Suspects Israeli agents plant devices during building maintenance.
Warning against "human factors" like cleaning staff or close associates. | Fears Israel recruits insiders for monitoring.
Broader Context: A Globalizing Conflict
This defensive posture coincides with international assessments that Hamas itself is shifting toward external operations. Reports from European counter-terrorism agencies indicate Hamas had pre-positioned weapons caches in several European countries years in advance and, following the October 7 attacks, directed operatives to retrieve them for potential use. Some analysts believe Hamas may see international attacks as a way to gain leverage in ceasefire negotiations.
The situation creates a complex international security landscape, where Hamas leaders are hiding from strikes while some of its operatives may be planning attacks abroad, with Israel actively targeting both.
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